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Abstract
Business process logs are composed of event records generated, collected and analyzed at different locations, asynchronously
and under the responsibility of different authorities. Their analysis is often delegated to auditors who have a mandate for
monitoring processes and computing metrics but do not always have the rights to access the individual events used to compute
them. A major challenge of this scenario is reconciling the requirements of privacy and access control with the need to
continuously monitor and assess the business process. In this paper, we present a model, a language and a software toolkit for
controlling access to process data where logs are made available as streams of RDF triples referring to some company-specific
business ontology. Our approach is based on the novel idea of dynamic enforcement: we incrementally build dynamic filters
for each process instance, based on the applicable access control policy and on the current prefix of the event stream. The
implementation and performance validation of our solution is also presented.
1 Introduction
Business process analysis is the activity of reviewing exist-
ing business practices and changing them so that they fit a
new, improved process model. By conducting process anal-
ysis, companies expect to streamline their internal processes
and become more effective in their business operation [1].
Traditionally, research in this field spans two major areas:
Process Monitoring (PMon), also called Business Activity
Monitoring, which collects and processes events while they
occur, and Process Mining (PMin), which typically focuses
on the offline analysis of process logs. Both areas describe
business processes using abstract concepts such as tasks, sub-
processes, start and end times, properties, relationships and
work-flows. Such basic entities are usually organized into a
schema, which can be extended to define additional domain-
specific concepts (Fig. 1). The difference between monitoring





1 Stratio, Madrid, Spain
2 Università Degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy
3 Center on Cyber-Physical Systems, Khalifa University, Abu
Dhabi, UAE
4 EBTIC, Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, UAE
events. In Pmon, remote process probes broadcast events over
the network to be analyzed by monitors; in Pmin, event data
are often imported to some static data lake. Both PMon and
PMin have been extensively studied in the literature [2–4],
but the problem of performing PMon while satisfying privacy
and access control requirements has received less attention.
In order to clarify the problem, we need first to introduce
some basic terminology of computer security. We follow [5]
distinguishing between Access Control (AC) policies, mech-
anisms, and models. AC policies are high-level requirements
that express who or what should be granted or denied access
to what resources. AC mechanisms implement such policies
in an IT system. For example, AC policies are often expressed
as rules of the form Requestor:Resource:Condition:Action
that the AC mechanism (usually implemented as a Policy
Evaluation Point (PEP)) can be used to determine whether
an access request to a resource should be granted or denied.
Finally, AC models are formal representations of the internal
operation of AC mechanisms, used to prove their correctness.
In our case, the resources to be accessed are business pro-
cess streams including (representations of) activities, tasks,
and their attributes. Intuition suggests that a mechanism for
enforcing AC policies on such resources could be a filter, san-
itizing the process event and leaving only the information the
requester is entitled to see. Indeed, filters have been proposed
since long as a practical way to exclude events from, or oth-
erwise, manipulate business process logs [6]; but the study
of automatic generation of log filters as an AC mechanism is
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still in its infancy. The problem got even more difficult with
the advent of multi-enterprise business coalitions: besides
having a huge size, today’s process streams are generated,
collected and analyzed asynchronously, at different locations
and under the control of different organizations. In such sce-
narios, writing the filter corresponding to a given AC policy
manually is awkward and error-prone, and solutions targeting
Big Data source are needed [7,8].
In this paper, we present a model and the corresponding
extension to the standard XACML policy language [9] for
controlling access to process streams. The stream is repre-
sented as a flow of RDF [10] triples complying with some
company-specific activity ontology. We discuss representa-
tional issues in Sect. 2.2. In Sect. 2.4, we briefly discuss the
related but distinct problem of mapping finer-grained events
(e.g., sensor readings) to activities, whose solution is out-
side the scope of this paper. Encoding process events as RDF
triples is a solid way to achieve a semantic extension of tra-
ditional process logs, specifying the semantics of individual
model elements [11] and ensuring that process log items can
be universally understood by all applications that have the
relevant domain knowledge. This explicit encoding of events
can be exploited by our AC mechanism in enforcing XACML
access policies on the stream by computing and dynamically
updating a process log filter. Applying the filter generates a
fully sanitized flow of events, complying with the AC pol-
icy. Besides enforcing the AC policy, our technique “weaves
the log” in order to preserve the semantic integrity of the
sanitized process flow (e.g., w.r.t. timing). We claim that our
approach is: (i) fully compatible with current access con-
trol models like classic Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
[12] and (ii) suitable for deployment in a Big Data envi-
ronment where processes are continuously monitored and
users can register continuous queries in order to be notified
by new events matching their query. Last but not least, our
approach supports policy auditing: being written in a standard
language which is suitable for auditing [13], our extended
XACML policies can be forwarded to an independent audi-
tor to verify their compliance with auditing rules and other
regulations without disclosing the process data. Indeed, our
technique is particularly suitable for use cases where audit-
ing is of paramount importance, such as telecommunication
companies and cloud providers1. The remainder of the paper
is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the process data
model used in our system. In Sect. 3, we discuss and com-
pare the related work to our approach. Section 4 summarizes
our main contributions. In Sect. 5, we present our exten-
1 Such organizations are subject to data protection regulations from a
variety of organizations ranging from the European Union (Data Reten-
tion Directive) to national and international law enforcement agencies.
Regulations explicitly prescribe the deployment of AC mechanisms that
prevent unauthorized access to clients’ critical information [14,15]
sion to XACML, while Sect. 6 describes our enforcement
mechanism in detail. Finally, Sect. 7 validates our approach
by providing a proof of correctness (Sect. 7.1) and an experi-
mental performance analysis (Sect. 7.2). Section 8 concludes
the paper and discusses future research directions.
2 Representing Process Log Data
The collection of event logs is a pre-condition to business
process analysis. Event logs originate from the messages gen-
erated by an executing procedure or by a probe installed to
capture events. The data structure adopted for event logs can
be organized in a variety of ways [16].
In this section, we discuss semantics-aware log represen-
tation; then, we introduce our extensible RDFS schema for
representing process logs, suitable for PMin and PMon appli-
cations.
2.1 Event-Logs Standards
The Process Mining community has encouraged the adop-
tion of the eXtensible Event Stream (XES) [17], that is the
format processed by most BPMin algorithms and libraries.
This standard correlates events generated during a same busi-
ness process execution, by the notion of case, and sequences
them based on their associated time-stamps. It also includes
the notions of the originator of an event and the resources
exploited during its execution.
A known limit of this standard is to impose a flat multi-
dimensional data structure2. A general limitation of flat
log formats is their redundancy, as entities (e.g., involved
resources) recurring in multiple events are recorded in all cor-
responding event tuples. Relational [19] or graph-based [20]
databases for storing event log data have been proposed as a
solution to address this limitation. Besides handling process
data, using a database supports computing views on them.
Query patterns allow to extract log files collecting variants
of a business process that comply with specific perspectives
[21–23]. For example, they can isolate processes executed
by a specific department, within a specific time-frame, or
failing to achieve specific performance levels. As a result,
these different variants can be comparatively assessed get-
ting relevant insight into the enablers of specific behaviors
[24,25]. Partially motivated by the same reasons, the authors
of [26] proposed an ontology-based data access procedure
to support the extraction of event logs from a legacy sys-
tem, using a domain-specific conceptual model. All these
techniques perform manipulation after collection and are
2 Object-oriented representation that can capture one-to-many and
many-to-many relationships among events have been proposed [18]
but not yet deployed in practice.
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therefore more suitable for Pmin than for Pmon applications.
Also, they imply data normalization, reducing redundancy
at the expense of requiring expensive joins at extraction time
[27].
2.2 Semantics-Aware Process Log Representations
Besides multi-dimensional analysis, the conceptual model
encoding process logs can support the definition of addi-
tional transformation functions. Representation languages
equipped with a formal semantics support (i) the organiza-
tion of data according to different levels of abstraction, (ii) the
composition of knowledge from multiple sources, or (iii) the
identification of conflicting facts that identify the violation
of expected behavior.
Identifying the appropriate abstraction level is a key
prerequisite for event-logs analysis [28]. Moreover, when
integrating logs from multiple systems, even in presence of
a common vocabulary, multiple abstraction levels may apply
at the source level, imposing specific reconciliation strategies
[29]. Formal semantics can extend the capability of execut-
ing conformance checking procedures by assessing an event
log in integration with external knowledge [30].
Early proposals of semantics-aware PMin focused on
extending event logs with annotations linked to a concep-
tual model [31,32], if necessary supporting transformation
stages [33,34].
In [20], an RDF serialization of graphs is adopted to model
and analyze process logs. In this paper, we rely on a model we
already used for semantic lifting [35], model reconciliation
[29] and knowledge discovery [25].
2.3 The EBTIC-BPM Process Vocabulary
Today’s PMon tools have to be flexible enough to han-
dle process information that was unknown at the time of
process model definition [20]. Our approach relies on two
standards: the Resource Description Framework (RDF) [10]
and RDF Schema (RDFS) [36]. We shall not try to provide
any RDF/RDFS tutorial in this section: the interested reader
can refer to [10,36]. Historically, RDF has been used as meta-
data, i.e., to annotate logs (and, in general, data streams) by
adding information about data provenance, collection, etc.
[37]. Here, we use RDFS to provide a vocabulary defining
the basic entities of the business process domain. This sim-
ple representation allows a high degree of flexibility and at
the same time includes all entities (concepts, relations, and
attributes) that are needed by process management applica-
tions.
The RDF schema shown in Fig. 1 is actually just an
envelope which includes only two concepts: ebtic-bpm:
Process, which represents the business process, and
ebtic-bpm:Task, which represents the activities that
Fig. 1 The conceptual model representing the basic business process
representation
compose the process. Each concept has a basic set of
attributes: ebtic-bpm:startTime and ebticbpm:
endTime, which represent the beginning and termina-
tion times. The relation between these two basic concepts
defines the simplest way to represent a business process.
The ebtic-bpm:hasTask relation links ebtic-bpm:
Process to ebtic-bpm:Task and represents the set
of tasks belonging to a process. Three more relations
apply to the ebtic-bpm:Task concept: ebtic-bpm:
followedBy, ebticbpm:precededBy and ebtic-
bpm:hasSubTask, which respectively indicate which
tasks precede and follow a given one and which tasks are sub-
tasks of a given one. These relations allow layering our model
with specific ontologies describing the business activities
addressed by an organization or additional domain knowl-
edge originated from normative or contractual regulations
[20].
2.4 From Sensor Events to Semantics-Aware Log
Entries
Most tools recording events adopt a fine-grained represen-
tation model suitable to the events generated during process
enactment rather than to business process activities. Activ-
ities’ and events’ representations may have very different
abstraction levels, leading to misinterpretation of process
analysis results [38]. Consider, for example, the event logs
of a sensor network that collects sensor records. The abstract
start and end event delimiting execution of a process activ-
ity may correspond to variable sequences of finer-grained
events [39]. Our semantic-aware log format is indeed the tar-
get of a semantic lifting procedure [35,40] which is outside
the scope of this paper. Recently, machine learning proce-
dures have been adopted to automatically learn a mapping
linking aggregated events with activities at the business pro-
cess level [41,42].
2.5 Software Architecture
Zeus, our process analysis platform [43], is a PMon system
based on the data model introduced in the previous sec-
tion. As illustrated in Fig. 2, Zeus includes monitors that use
domain-specific extensions of the EBTIC-BPM basic vocab-
ulary to tag process events and submits the corresponding
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RDF triples to the Zeus triple store. In other words, when
a monitor detects an activity, it generates the RDF triples
representing it and sends them to the message queue. A mes-
sage listener reads the message queue and inserts the triples
into the Zeus triple store [43]. The Zeus triple store exposes
a SPARQL query service allowing external applications to
query it. SPARQL is a standard query language for RDF
graphs based on conjunctive queries on triple patterns, which
identify paths in the RDF graph [44]. SPARQL (or its ad
hoc extensions like FPSPARQL [45]) is used for analyzing
event logs of process-related systems, enabling analysts to
group-related events in the logs or find paths among events.
A major feature of the Zeus triple store that makes it suitable
for handling streams is that it allows to register continuous
SPARQL queries; such queries are automatically invoked
whenever new triples get inserted in the Zeus triple store,
and their results are automatically returned to the client that
registered the query.
3 PMon Security and Access Control
In this section, we discuss related work in two research areas
relevant to our approach: business process security and RDF
access control.
3.1 Access Control to Business Process Mining and
Monitoring
Access Control (AC) constrains “what a user can do directly,
as well as what programs executing on behalf of the users are
allowed to do” [5]. In other words, AC decides which subject
is authorized to perform certain operations on a given object
and which is not. Along the years, many AC models like
access control lists (ACL), capability lists and role-based
access control (RBAC) have been proposed. In particular,
RBAC models proposed in the 1990s [12,46] are still widely
used today. AC models for business processes have been
mostly aimed at process execution, i.e., at controlling who
can perform process activities. Some early works in this area
discussed authorizations to perform Web interactions [47]
or service invocations [48]. Later, Russell and van der Aalst
[49] have surveyed various possibilities for assigning process
activities to users. Wainer et al. [50] proposed the W-RBAC
access control model, featuring an expressive logic-based
language for selecting users that are authorized to perform
certain process tasks. Over time, additional approaches for
dealing with other security issues related to process manage-
ment were introduced. In the context of the ADEPT project,
Barbara Weber et al. [51] dealt with controlling access to
process schemata, extending RBAC to support design-time
actions like schema changes. In turn, the CEOSIS project
proposed a way to adapt this type of AC rules when the
underlying organizational model is changed [52]. A method
for verification of security policies for business processes is
presented in [53], where the authors present a system for
automatic verification of secure models in order to prevent
implicit information leaks about confidential parts of the pro-
cess flow.
These lines of research are related to ours, inasmuch as the
resources to be accessed are the representations of the activ-
ities in the process log rather than the services performing
such activities or the entities in the process schema.
Event flows generated by process monitors have been tra-
ditionally filtered using static ad hoc views on event stores
[46]. This technique works as follows: for each process
schema, a number of static views is manually defined, each
of them including the information accessible for users with a
particular role. This way, rights over the process are defined
implicitly by each view. The view-based approach relies on
existing view definition languages (a survey on RDFS view
definition can be found in [54]) to express access rights over
process data. However, static views are costly to maintain.
If the underlying process schema is modified, views affected
by this change have to be identified, possibly among a large
number of existing views. Also, when a user has multiple
roles, more than one view applies, and view combination
may lead to conflicts with unexpected results.
An AC model aimed at process logs has been described in
the framework of the Proviado project for process data visual-
ization [55,56]. The Proviado access control model expresses
access rights on specific process aspects called objects. How-
ever, while the Proviado AC language has been used to
express access rights in some process analysis case stud-
ies, no enforcement on streams has been described. Another
related line of research is the one that led to Staab and
Ringelstein’s PAPEL (Provenance Aware Policy definition
and Execution Language) [57].
PAPEL focuses on policies expressing temporal condi-
tions based on processing histories and uses a sticky logging
mechanism to provide the needed provenance. A point of
contact with our work is that conditions are checked on
graphs, but in the case of PAPEL, the graph structure rep-
resents the process log’s temporal structure. While PAPEL
syntax is very different from standard XACML, the language
scope is fully complementary to ours (Sect. 7.2).
Finally, it is important to remark that AC is not the only
motivation for filtering process models and log data. Selec-
tive visualization of process models has been proposed since
long to enable process analysis at different levels of abstrac-
tion (for example point-of-view analysis [23]). For instance,
Polyvanyy et al. [58] describe structural aggregations of the
process logic in order to realize different levels of abstraction.
Greco et al. [59] proposed an approach to produce hierarchi-
cal process views of the process that capture process behavior
at a different level of detail. However, none of these tech-
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Fig. 2 The conceptual
architecture of Zeus, our
RDF-based PMon system
niques handles selective visualization of data generated by
process monitoring.
3.2 RDF Access Control
The protection of information encoded in RDF graphs rep-
resents a relatively novel direction of research. In [60],
the authors present their Semantic Based Access Control
(SBAC), a model based on OWL ontologies3. SBAC is only
partly relevant to our research, as it is aimed at controlling
access to elements of RDF Schemata (Concepts, Individuals,
Attributes and Relations). Other researchers used RDF anno-
tations to complement AC policies. A seminal paper on this
topic is [62], where the authors show that standard AC policy
languages like XACML can be extended via RDF anno-
tations and describe a reference architecture for enforcing
annotated AC policies. This line of research was developed
in more recent works. For instance, [63] presents ROWL-
BAC, a role-based access control architecture defined using
the OWL ontology language. This way, existing OWL rea-
3 OWL stands for Ontology Web Language and is an extension of RDF
based on Description Logics [61].
soners can be used for policy evaluation and policies defined
with this language are exportable and verifiable.
Access control mechanisms targeting RDF triple stores
are more relevant to this paper. In the abundant literature on
this subject, we identify two main trends: the former relies
on access control lists pointing to specific elements of RDF
graphs (concepts, relations, attributes, and triples), while the
latter uses the AC policy to define a set of “safe views” on
the triple store’s RDFS schema. An example of the former
approach is the one proposed by Chen et al. [64], where the
standard XACML policy language is used to control access to
elements of an ontology at A-Box level. In their implementa-
tion, a security proxy rewrites incoming SPARQL queries in
order to make them policy-compliant. However, their rewrit-
ing uses a static technique where pre-set filters are appended
to individual user queries.
Both approaches are static in nature, but the former is
complicated by the fact that simple facts (i.e., individual RDF
triples) cannot be omitted or deleted by the AC enforcement
mechanism without risking to compromise the integrity of the
information passed on to the requester. The latter approach
makes it easier to grant access to sub-graphs (or transformed
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graphs) of the original RDF graph that preserve information
integrity.
A straightforward development of the latter line of
research is run-time composition of safe views with user
queries, thus enforcing access control policies via query
rewriting. Our approach falls into this category: providing
a query rewriting mechanism which allows to maintain the
integrity of the graph. However, with respect to available
rewriting approaches, our solution is applied on a stream of
RDF triples instead of a static RDF graph. Most query rewrit-
ing approaches assume that AC policies can be expressed
as sets of static views; so when a requester wants to query
the data, her safe view can be retrieved and composed with
her query. Generally speaking, given a set of views V =
{V1, V2, . . . , Vn} over a RDF graph G, and a SPARQL query
Q over the vocabulary of the views, query rewriting computes
a SPARQL query Q0 over G such that Q0(G) = Q(V (G)).
Rewriting must satisfy two properties: soundness and com-
pleteness [65]. Namely:
– a rewriting is sound ⇐⇒ Q0(G) ⊆ Q(V (G));
– a rewriting is complete ⇐⇒ Q(V (G)) ⊆ Q0(G).
Checking these properties may be easy in a static RDF
triple store but is unfeasible for stream scenarios where triples
are generated dynamically and may not be all present at the
time of enforcement. Also, SPARQL rewriting algorithms
used to enforce access control policies [65] tend to show high
complexity either in time or in the number of views involved.
The reason is somewhat intuitive: whenever a requester sub-
mits a query, it is necessary to identify which safe views
need to be taken into account to rewrite it. The work coming
closer to our approach in terms of rewriting policies is proba-
bly the SPARQL Query Rewriting (SQR) proposal [65]. This
proposal relies on the following idea: if a variable mapping
exists between a pattern in the result description and one of
the triple patterns in the graph pattern of a query Q, then
we can conclude that view Vj is needed to rewrite Q. SQR
performs the query rewriting in two steps. In the first step,
the algorithm determines, for each triple pattern in the user
query, the set of views whose variables appear in the pat-
tern. In the second step, the algorithm rewrites the original
query as a union of conjunctive queries to the triple store.
Rewritten queries use the original schema graph but select
only “authorized” nodes. A similar approach is mentioned
in a patent [66] that describes a method to rewrite SPARQL
queries based on static views.
However, the approaches available so far are static
approaches which are applied on a static graph, while our
approach is applied on a stream of incoming RDF triples,
which is dynamic by nature. For this reason, it is hard to
experimentally compare the described related works with our
approach.
4 Research Contributions
Our approach provides several new contributions with
respect to the state of the art4.
A first contribution is dynamic filter generation: upon
receiving an access request, our technique automatically gen-
erates a filter and keeps updating it on the basis of the events
generated by process execution. Our filters are continuously
applied to the process event flow to keep it compliant with
the AC policy. This will ensure that queries performed by
the users (e.g., to compute performance metrics over the
process) are executed on a “sanitized” flow of events. Our
approach is suitable for deployment in a real-time environ-
ment where processes are continuously monitored and users
can register continuous queries in order to be notified when
new events matching their query arrive. As we shall see in
Sect. 6, our technique is less expensive in terms of compu-
tation than approaches based on static views, which use the
entire AC policy to build the views associated with a user.
A second contribution is preserving the log’s semantic
integrity. We use XACML obligation mechanism to keep
the sanitized flow sound with respect to the correctness of
metrics computed on it, like total elapsed time. In standard
XACML, an obligation is a directive on an action that must
be carried out after access is approved. We use obligations
as a way to require filter updates on demand, i.e., when new
triples arrive.
A third contribution is our approach’s auditability due
to standard syntax of AC policies. Most existing solutions
provide an abstract AC model to define access rights in an
abstract format, but such access rights must then be manu-
ally mapped to static views over process data; this mapping
process is error-prone and difficult to debug independently.
Our approach allows policy authors to write their policies
in standard XACML. Such policies can be forwarded to an
independent evaluator to verify that they are compliant with
auditing rules and data protection regulations [13]. As we
shall see, our extensions to XACML are fully modular and
comply with the prescribed language extension points5, so
they do not affect policy audit.
5 The Policy Language
In order to support the Administrator in writing AC poli-
cies in a machine-readable format, we defined an extension
of the standard XACML policy language [9]. Our extension
is not focused on process logs; rather, it provides a generic
obligation language for RDF streams. The format of our obli-
gations is composed of five main elements, described in detail
in Table 1.
4 Our AC engine is covered by US Patent 20150172320.
5 http://mvpos.sourceforge.net/xacml.htm.
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Following the sample process log introduced in Sect. 2 we
will now define a set of restrictions on the process flow using
our language.
For the sake of simplicity and as further motivated in
the evaluation section, we define a policy that is somewhat
simplified with respect to real-life ones but will ease under-
standing of the results of our evaluation. Let us assume that a
process analyst is called in for performing analysis on our
sample process on loan approval. Due to data protection
regulations6 all details of loan applications should only be
accessible to employees involved in their assessment, and
not to the process analyst. In our sample loan application pro-
cess, all the activities related to the submission, acceptance,
and approval of a loan can be performed by different types
of agents (human or automatic systems). To ensure compli-
ance with regulations, the process analyst is not allowed to
see the type of agent that performed these actions in case the
amount of the loan is equal to (or greater than) a certain value.
We define a policy associated with the role of process ana-
lyst. The policy replaces the type of agent with a generic one
where the conditions described previously are verified. Once
the analyst authenticates and logs into the system, a standard
XACML policy is used to verify that her credentials enable
her to access the log after sanitization. Definition 2 provides
a version of this policy in simplified English. Once access
is granted, the set of obligations shown in Definition 2 is
enforced by our system against the stream of triples of the














?tasktype rdfs:subClassOf ebtic-bpm:task }
Replace{
?task rdf:type ebtic-bpm:task }
}
DecisionPoint{
?task ebtic-bpm:endTime ?endTime} (1)
6 In the USA, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Moderniza-
tion Act (GLB Act), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12,
1999).
The incoming triples are verified against the Match block;
in our sample policy we look for processes having a task
performed by an agent of type “human.” In case the triple
matches the match block then the conditions need to be tested
in order to verify if it can be added to the user’s sanitized
RDF graph. As seen in Eq. 2, our policy expresses three
disjunctive conditions: one checking that the loan process
is for an amount of 100000 and that the task performed by
a human agent is of type submission. A second condition
is checking that the loan process is still for an amount of
100000 and that the task performed by a human agent is of
type accepted and a final alternative condition is checking in
the process is for an amount of 200000 and the task performed
by the human agent is of type approved. In case one of these
conditions is verified, the triples in the find block are removed
from the graph and replaced with the ones in the replace
block. The conditions are verified on the same process until
either they are satisfied or the decision point is reached. In
our sample policy the decision point if the triple indicating
the ending time of the process. This way, even if the filter
updater seems to process a triple at the time, the decision
point provides a mechanism to handle the triples of a process
as related.
Policy#1:
In Process Loan it is denied Analystwith has_access_to
Task Submittedwith amount more than 100000,
or Task Approvedwith amount more than 200000,
or Task Acceptedwith amount more than 100000. (2)
6 Overview of the Approach
In this section, we provide an overview of our AC mechanism
(Fig. 3). The goal of the approach is to generate a logical
process log for each user (or client application), showing
only the information the user is entitled to see according to
the AC policy and preserving the semantic integrity of the
resulting RDF stream.
For the sake of simplicity, here we model only two stake-
holders but the same mechanism can be executed with more
actors. In the example we use, the Requester (i.e., the ana-
lyst/auditor accessing the process) assigns access rights to
the Administrator (i.e., the process owner or a delegate) by
encoding them in an XACML policy. The policy is enforced
by a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) operating on the incom-
ing stream of process events. Let us now describe the entities
mentioned in Fig. 3 in more detail.
6.1 The Filter Updater
The Filter Updater takes care of creating and incrementally
updating the filter to be used for computing the Requestor’s
view of the process data. At any given time, each Requestor u
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Table 1 Policy elements Policy element Description
Task This element can assume two values: allow or deny. It pro-
vides information on the effect of the policy: if it allows the
resources to be accessed by the Requestor or vice versa
Match This element is the resource on which the policy will be applied;
it represents a set of RDF triples that the Requestor is allowed to
access or not (according to the value of Task)
Condition This element contains a set of graph patterns which are translated
for their evaluation into SPARQL ASK queriesa on the process
flow that needs to be satisfied in order to apply the policy. Con-
ditions can be connected with logical operators (And, Or and
Not)
Alternative This element is used to sanitize the RDF graph when the
Requestor is not authorized to access the triples in the Match
Block. The Alternative element has two children: Find and
Replace containing a graph pattern each. The Find element tells
the Filter Updater which part of the original RDF data needs to
be replaced with the Requestor-specific Replace one.
DecisionPoint This element contains a graph pattern that acts as a terminator:
when it is found in the flow, the PEP stops the evaluation of
Conditionsb
aASK queries return results of type Boolean and are best suited to identify the existence of a graph pattern
in the RDF graph
bThe DecisionPoint element is important because the policies are applied to streams of triples. When a triple
matching the Match block is detected, Condition may not yet be satisfied, but it can become so due to other
triples that come next in the flow. So, the PEP goes on checking until DecisionPoint is reached
corresponds to a filter Vu =< Vallow, Vdeny, Valternative >,
where Vallow, Vdeny and Valternative are sets of selec-
tors representing the policies (or, better, the obligations)
{P1, .., Pi , .., Pn} that apply to the requestor. We also intro-
duce a constraint of mutually exclusion between Vallow and
Vdeny , so that if Vallow ≡ ∅ ⇐⇒ Vdeny = ∅, because
all obligations associated to a given Requestor have to be
consistent with respect to the Task value (deny or allow).
This is enforced both at the time of loading the policies in
the system, by checking that only one type of obligations
is present (allow or deny), and at the time of policies edit-
ing, by preventing the policy editor to put both deny and
allow types of obligations. This implies the Filter Updater
create and update the filter Vu by maintaining two selectors
Qi and Q Ai for each policy Pi so that, each element Vallow
or Vdeny , and Valternative are composed by a set of selectors
Vallow = {Q1, .., Qi , .., Qn} or Vdeny = {Q1, .., Qi , .., Qn}
depending on the Task value (allow or deny) and mutually
exclusive, and Valternative = {Q A1, .., Q Ai , .., Q An}. We
represent a selector Qi or Q Ai as a SPARQL CONSTRUCT





RD is the Result Descriptor (RD) which is triples pattern
representing the triples the query will return to the user, while
G P is the Graph Pattern (GP) in the RDF graph that will
extract the triples from the RDF graph to filter and that will
be used to create RD. Let us assume that all users subscribe to
the log at the same time t=0. At t=0, all access policies get
simultaneously enforced and all filters are empty. Each time
a monitor generates a new triple, the Filter Updater checks
if the Requestor u is allowed to access the triple by invoking
the PEP. The results of these calls update the selectors Qi and
Q Ai . Each call to the PEP is performed by passing the triple
to filter, the PEP and returns an element containing the pol-
icy’s unique identifier, the type of Task (allow or deny), the
Match block and the satisfied conditions or the Alternative
block in case the triple needs to be filtered out. The results
returned by the PEP to the Filter Updater are used to update
the two selectors Qi and Q Ai of the policy Pi represented
by the Vallow, Vdeny and Valternative sets in the filter Vu . The
selectors are updated according to the templates shown in
Table 2. Each element contained in the response from the
PEP is replaced in the template: in case the Match block
is returned, the element [RD] is replaced by the graph pat-
tern contained in the Match block and the [G P] element is
replaced by the graph pattern in the Match combined with
the graph patterns of the elements in the Condition block.
In case an Alternative block is returned, the element [RD]
is replaced by the triples in the graph pattern defined in the
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Fig. 3 Conceptual architecture
of the AC system
Table 2 Selector templates for each policy Pi in case of allow types of
policies
Qi QAi
CONSTRUCT { CONSTRUCT {
[match] } [alternative.replace]}
WHERE { WHERE {
{[match]. [alternative.find].
[conditions]} (FILTER NOT EXISTS {
(UNION {[match]. GP(Qi)})?
[conditions]})*} }
Replace part of the alternative block and the [G P] element
is defined by the graph pattern defined in the Find part of
the Alternative block minus the Graph Pattern G P(Qi ) this
in order to ensure that the selectors contained in Valternative
only replace triples where the policy conditions apply. In
case the policy does not apply to the triple, a null result is
returned and the selectors Qi and Q Ai are not updated.
As an example let us consider the policy previously
defined in 1 and the stream of triples reported in Table 3:
when the first triple arrives, the Filter Updater asks the PEP
if the user is allowed to see the triple, the PEP analyses the
triple against the Match block. Since it does not match the
graph patter in the Match block and the Task is of type deny,
the user is allowed to see the triple.
At this time, the filter Vu is composed by the selector Q1
in Vdeny :
CONSTRUCT { ?s ?p ?o }
WHERE { ?s ?p ?o}.
This selector just returns all the triples in the original graph
G since the user at the moment is allowed to see all the
triples in the graph. The set of selectors in Valternative is
empty because there is no need to sanitize the flow. When
the fifth triple which matches the Match pattern arrives, the
conditions need to be tested in order for the Filter Updater
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Table 3 A sample stream of
triples based on the RDF































to decide if the user is allowed to see the triple. The sys-
tem generates a SPARQL ASK query for each condition by
replacing the variables in the graph pattern with the elements
of the triple (in this case the variables ?task and ?agent
replaced with the subject and object of the triple, respec-
tively) the conditions are tested until one is satisfied. In this
case, the conditions are all tested but none of them is satis-
fied, so the filter cannot decide if the user is allowed to see
the triple, so the triple is kept in a buffer until the decision
point is satisfied (seventh triple); testing the decision point
is done in the same way than testing the conditions, and it is
done for each triple kept in the buffer. The selectors are not
updated until the arrival of the triple, which satisfies the first
condition. At this point, the PER return to the filter updater a
response saying that the user is not allowed to see the triple
and the elements required for updating the selectors which
at this point are the ones reported in Table 4.
The filter updater processes all the triples in Table 3, and
at the end of the flow, the selectors Q1 and Q A1 will look
like the ones in Appendix A.
6.2 The RDF StreamDemultiplexer
The RDF Stream Demultiplexer (Fig. 3) makes our dynamic
selectors available as SPARQL endpoints to which the
Requestor can freely submit her queries. The Demulti-
plexer component provides Requestors with the abstraction
of separate logical process event flows. We remark that our
Demultiplexer is fully agnostic with respect to the choice
between materializing the user’s graph Gu and using a query
rewriting technique. In the former case, the Demultiplexer
applies the selectors computed by the Updater to the original
graph G as a dynamic continuous query [43] materializing
the graph Gu , whenever a new triple passes the filter. The
materialized graph Gu can be consulted by the user using
SPARQL query language transparently as a traditional triple
store. This approach maximizes performance but requires
additional storage space in order to physically store the
users’ graphs. It is a solution that is not advisable in case
of high number of different users with short-lived sessions
but can be safely adopted for testing purposes and experi-
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Table 4 Selectors after the first
condition is satisfied Q1 QA1
CONSTRUCT { CONSTRUCT {
?s ?p ?o } ?x1 bpi:agent ?x4.
WHERE { ?x2 ebtic-bpm:hasTask ?x1
{?s ?p ?o ?x4 rdf:type bpi:unknown.}
FILTER(NOT EXISTS{ WHERE{?x1 bpi:agent ?x0.
FILTER (?s = ?x0 OR ?s = ?x1 OR ?s = ?x2) ?x0 rdf:type bpi:human.
?x2 ebtic-bpm:hasTask ?x1. ?x2 ebtic-bpm:hasTask ?x1.
?x1 bpi:agente ?x0. FILTER(EXISTS{?x2 ebtic-bpm:hasTask ?x1.
?x0 rdf:type bpi:human. ?x1 bpi:agente ?x0.
?x2 ebtic-bpm:endTime ?x3. ?x0 rdf:type bpi:human.
?x1 rdf:type bpi:A_SUBMITTED . ?x2 ebtic-bpm:endTime ?x3.
?x2 bpi:amount 100000. ?x1 rdf:type bpi:A_SUBMITTED .
}} ?x2 bpi:amount 100000.}
mentation. In the latter case, the Demultiplexer simply waits
for the requestor to submit a query. When the query arrives,
our Demultiplexer uses the current set of selectors in Vu
to rewrite the original user query Qu with the selectors in
the filter Vu , applying a standard query rewriting algorithm
([65]) and executed the query on the original graph G. The
query rewriting technique is sound and complete, as shown in
Sect. 3.2, and it ensures that the triples returned by the query
are equivalent to executing the SPARQL query to the sani-
tized graph Gu , the difference, in this case, is that Gu is not
materialized. Depending on deployment constrains (space,
processing power, number of users and policies), one deploy-
ment solution may be preferable to the other.
7 Validation
To validate our approach, we considered three aspects: cor-
rectness, completeness, and performance. Correctness can
be formally proved, as illustrated in Sect. 7.1. Complete-
ness requires the availability of ground truth and will then
be assessed only on a restrict set of triples, Sect. 7.1. Perfor-
mance is analyzed against the SQR approach, as discussed
in Sect. 7.2.
7.1 Correctness and Completeness
To discuss the correctness of our approach, we have to focus
on the construction of the filter Vu .
Each of the selectors Qi and Q Ai created by the filter
updater for each policy Pi returns a view over the original
RDF graph G. As discussed previously in Sect. 5, our policy
language allows to define two types of obligations: allow
and deny which are mutually exclusive (Vallow ≡ ∅ ⇐⇒
Vdeny = ∅). We can define an obligation Pi as the pair {Qi ∈
(Vallow ∪ Vdeny), Q Ai ∈ (Valternative)}. With the notation
[[Q]]G , we define the result of the execution of a query Q
over an RDF graph G, which in case of a CONSTRUCT
query is an RDF graph.
Let us start from the case of allow type obligations, and the
sanitized graph G Pi related to a specific policy is the union
of the results from the queries Qi and Q Ai which can be
defined as:
G Pi ≡ [[Qi ]]G ∪ [[Q Ai ]]G,
since the final graph for a user u is the graph Gu returned by







([[Qi ]]G ∪ [[Q Ai ]]G),
which, for the commutative property of the union operator,

























then, the sanitized graph Gu can be defined as:
Gu ≡ Gu_allow ∪ Gu_alternative,
which is the union of the results of the single executions of
the selectors contained in Vallow and Valternative (as defined
using the templates in Table 2).
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In the case, the Task value of the policy is of deny type,
and Gallow will be the set-theoretical difference between the
original RDF graph G and the union of all the triples the user
is not authorized to access (Vdeny) 7. This can be defined as:








which can be rewritten as the intersection of the graphs gen-






G \ [[Qi ]]G
⎞
⎠ ,
this aspect needs to be considered in case the deny queries
are divided into separate executions. By definition [44], the
results of such queries are themselves RDF graphs; therefore,
the result of applying Vu over the original graph G is an
RDF graph Gu , which contains only triples that the user is
authorized to access.
To verify the completeness of our approach, it is required
to manually validate the triples resulted in the RD gener-
ated by the Demultiplexer. During our evaluation, we tested
around 400 triples without observing any misalignment with
a ground truth result set used for comparison.
7.2 Performances
Generally speaking, the complexity of the evaluation prob-
lem for SPARQL queries [68] is known to be NP-complete in
case no OPTIONAL operators are present in the query, while
is PSPACE-complete in the presence of OPTIONAL opera-
tors. Still, efficient execution of SPARQL has been achieved
in many practical systems by using data partitioning heuris-
tics [69].
In our policies, we do not impose any restriction to the
use of the OPTIONAL operator, which can be present in the
conditions block of the policy. However, boolean operators
used to combine different conditions inside the conditions
block can be used to limit the need for OPTIONAL operator
only to exceptional cases. In order to validate our approach,
we designed a set of experiments to measure performance
improvement provided by our dynamic filtering enforcement
approach with respect to an approach that statically apply
filters such as SQR [65]. In fact, SQR can dynamically gen-
erate queries, but the enforcement of the filtering procedure
is statically applied to any triple it processes. This means
that SQR can be applied to a stream of RDF triples, but
7 Traditional view-based approaches do not consider this types of poli-
cies [65].
the triples are filtered by applying the entire policy, making
it inefficient. Our approach builds the filter dynamically by
applying only the necessary part of the policy. The exper-
iment presented in this section is intended to show that,
even given the high complexity of SPARQL query answer-
ing, our approach provides a viable solution for a practical
PMon system, suitable for further improvement, e.g., by data
partitioning heuristics. Since stream filter execution heavily
impacts the overall performance of PMon, an improvement in
this aspect positively affects the entire behavior of the system.
We implemented our AC mechanism as a set of components
for the Zeus process analyzer [43]. In our implementation,
Requestors request a SPARQL endpoint address or submit a
SPARQL query through a Web Service interface, after stan-
dard authentication. The Web Service takes care of passing
the Requestor’s credentials to the other components where
policies are extracted and applied. In our experiment, the
Demultiplexer physically decouples the RDF graph Gu from
the original graph G of triples. The data used for this experi-
ment are the BPI Challenge 2012 [67] introduced in Sect. 2.
The log is composed of 13.087 process instances and 262.200
activity instances divided into 24 different activity types. The
log is available in the OpenXES8 format, and therefore it has
been converted into RDF in order to be used with our system.
The resulting RDF graph is composed of 2.379.557 triples.
Experiments were carried out on a desktop pc with proces-
sor Intel core i5 2,53 ghz with 8 GBytes (1067 MHz) of
RAM memory and Hard Disk of 500 GBytes (5400 rpm).
The test-suite has been developed using Java9 version 7. The
test-suite is composed by a Java implementation of the AC
module, represented by the conceptual architecture in Fig. 2
and described in detail in Sect. 6, the flow of events, a log re-
player and a flow listener. The flow of events is represented by
a message queue10 ensuring that the overhead introduced by
the message queue does not influence the performance of our
approach. The events (represented by the triples in the RDF
log) are inserted in the message queue by a Log re-player,
which reads the RDF representation of the BPI Challenge
Log and submits the triples to the message queue with a con-
figurable delay between triples. From our experience in a
real deployment of the analyzer, we observed that the arrival
rate of triples is not constant: normally the process monitors
generate bursts of triples to represent new activities in the
monitored process. In the BPI Challenge log, an activity is
defined by a block of 10 triples providing information on
the identifier of the activity, its type, the process the activity
belongs to, preceding activities, the start time and end time
of the activity and the values of its attributes. This behavior
has been simulated in the log re-player which sends to the
8 http://www.xes-standard.org/.
9 http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/.
10 for this experiment we used ActiveMQ http://activemq.apache.org/.
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Fig. 4 Performance results of dynamic filter
message queue blocks of 10 triples with a variable delay with
an average value of 1000 ms between the blocks. The bench-
mark represents the worst case scenario for our approach: the
number of different activity types is relatively small. The Lis-
tener is invoked every time a triple is detected in the message
queue and takes care of testing the triples against the PEP
(Fig. 3) informing the Filter Updater with the obligations to
apply to the triples flow. In order to simulate a stream analysis
environment, the cache of the events log where the conditions
are tested is cleaned and the RDF triples made persistent in
the final triple store. The policy used for the experiments is
the one defined in 1. The queries we used in the static SQR
test are reported in Appendix A. (They are equal to the selec-
tors when all the policy is applied.) We executed three runs
for each test and compared the average of the resulting times.
Results of our evaluation are shown in Fig. 4, which shows
query execution time in milliseconds (ms). It compares our
dynamic filtering approach versus the SQR static approach,
the X axis reports the number of triples processed. In the
chart is also present the time of execution of the queries
used to check the conditions performed by our PEP. In our
experimentation, RDF triples are regularly removed from the
stream and stored in the final repository. (Every 20000 com-
plete processes, the stream is cleared.) The vertical bars in the
chart represent the moments in the stream where one of the
conditions of the policy is verified. It is possible to see how
our approach remains well under the static one until the fifth
vertical bar when the selectors of the filter updater became
equivalent to the queries executed by the static approach. It
is also worth noticing that the time of execution of the testing
of the conditions is minimal 11. Also, our test has been car-
ried out on one policy at a time; in a production environment
where multiple AC policies are applied, the improvement in
query execution time due to building the filter dynamically
will improve.
11 The spikes in the chart are due to the Java garbage collector when
the triples buffer is cleaned.
8 Conclusions and Perspectives
In this paper, we presented a model and a toolkit for
controlling access to RDF streams generated by business
process monitoring. Our approach introduces a new notion
of dynamic enforcement: dynamic filters are incrementally
built for each process monitoring instance, based on the
applicable AC policy, on the requestor and on the current
content of the process event log. We consider dynamic fil-
tering a major innovation in enforcing multiple AC policies
on huge graph streams. When static filters are used, all user
queries use identical filters for determining which events of
the audit log they can access. Our dynamic filters respond
to real-time events in the process environment, setting only
the traps that suit the specific process trace when selecting
events to audit. Policy-wise, our approach is based on obliga-
tions in the standard XACML language and enables auditing
of AC policies on work-flow streams like any other policy
expressable in XACML. Today, results of audits on many
compliance-driven (e.g., “need-to-know”) mandates depend
on the audited organization having certified access control
regimes in place. We consider this to be a key factor for the
practical adoption of our approach. A related line of research
regards extending the scope of our XACML obligations. It
is important to remark that this would not require extending
their syntax: in the spirit of kindred languages like PAPEL
[57], it would suffice to add additional layers of metadata
expressing the timing (and possibly the physical location of
probes) of process event generation. RDF formats for such
layers have been available since long [70], and conditions
on such additional metadata layers can be straightforwardly
expressed using our current obligations. We see a number of
other directions for further developing our approach. First of
all, we designed our approach to be suitable for Big Data-
style, low-level parallelization by executing our filters in
parallel over a high number of data partitions corresponding
to probe locations. We plan to explore this aspect in a future
paper. Another aspect worth exploring is using reasoning to
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keep our dynamic filter compact. In our current implementa-
tion, when a Zeus process monitor submits a triple to which
a policy applies, the dynamic filter gets updated unless it
already contains a specific selector for the incoming triple.
However, it may conceivably be the case that the filter already
contains a selector that will filter out that triple anyway (e.g.,
because it filters a concept that subsumes concepts related to
the incoming triples).
If the Filter Updater could notice this selector absorption,
it would avoid adding a condition to the filter that will never
be checked. However, the amount of reasoning to be done to
notice absorption may in some cases be substantial and the
eventual gain (or loss) in performance would largely depend
on the log content. Trying to take into account absorption
in filter construction may also interfere with automatic cost
reordering of conjunctions in SPARQL query planning, a cru-
cial issue for SPARQL performance [68]. We plan to explore
this subject in a future paper.
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Appendix A
Selector Q1 in Vdeny
CONSTRUCT {?s ?p ?o .}






?x1 rdf:type bpi:A_SUBMITTED .
?x2 bpi:amount 100000 .





?x1 rdf:type bpi:A_APPROVED .
?x2 bpi:amount 200000 .





?x2 bpi:amount 100000 .
?x1 rdf:type bpi:A_ACCEPTED .
FILTER (?s = ?x0 OR?s = ?x1 OR ?s = ?x2)})}













?x1 rdf:type bpi:A_SUBMITTED .





?x1 rdf:type bpi:A_APPROVED .





?x2 bpi:amount 100000 .
?x1 rdf:type bpi:A_ACCEPTED .})}
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